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Abstract Conceptual art, and its rejection of the aesthetic, poses a number of
challenges to ‘traditional’ deοnitions of art. This paper considers whether art is ne-
cessarily aesthetic and what problems arise if we accept that it is not. My investiga-
tion will initially ask whether conceptual art (CA) can even be a kind of art, and will
then discuss whether CA is necessarily aesthetic. In section 2, I present a range of
existing views on this matter in order to show that conceptual art should indeed be
considered a kind of art. I offer an evaluation of these views in section 3 before ar-
guing that art in general is not necessarily aesthetic. In order to show this, I present
arguments in support of the propositions that (i) CA is a kind of art and that (ii) CA
is not aesthetic. Section 4 comprises a proposal suggesting that artworks are not
necessarily aesthetic but rather are necessarily experienced in person. I then brieπy
address a number of potential difοculties that accepting such a view might appear
to entail.
1 Introduction
“In conceptual art, the idea or concept is the most important aspect of the work […]
the idea becomes a machine that makes the art”
– LeWiĴ (2000)
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Conceptual art,1 and its rejection of the aesthetic, poses a number of challenges to
‘traditional’ deęnitions of art. This paper considers whether art is necessarily aesthetic
and what problems arise if we accept that it is not. My investigation will initially ask
whether conceptual art (CA) can even be a kind of art, and will then discuss whether
CA is necessarily aesthetic. In section 2, I present a range of existing views on this
maĴer in order to show that conceptual art should indeed be considered a kind of art.
I oěer an evaluation of these views in section 3 before arguing that art in general is
not necessarily aesthetic. In order to show this, I present arguments in support of the
propositions that (i) CA is a kind of art and that (ii) CA is not aesthetic.2 Section 4
comprises a proposal suggesting that artworks are not necessarily aesthetic but rather
are necessarily experienced in person. I then brieĚy address a number of potential
diĜculties that accepting such a view might appear to entail.
2 The problem of conceptual art
What I will hereby refer to as the ‘problem of conceptual art’ is best explained by high-
lighting a contradiction in the following three independently plausible propositions:
(i) CA is a kind of art.
(ii) CA is not aesthetic.
(iii) Art is necessarily aesthetic.
How can conceptual art, as a kind of art, be non-aesthetic if being aesthetic is a
necessary condition for something being art? A solution to the problem of conceptual
art can come in one of three forms. Firstly, onemight deny (i) that CA is a kind of art by
holding (ii) that CA is not aesthetic and (iii) that art is necessarily aesthetic. A second
solution might come in the form of denying (ii) that CA is not aesthetic while holding
(iii) that art is necessarily aesthetic but also (i) that CA is indeed a kind of art. Finally,
one might hold (i) that CA is a kind of art and (ii) that CA is not aesthetic and thereby
deny (iii) that being aesthetic is a necessary condition of art. That is the solution I argue
for in this paper.
I begin by voicing support for proposition (i). The task here is to show that CA is
art without solely targeting ‘aesthetic deęnitions’ of art. Simply opposing the claim
1. Conceptual art historically refers to the movement reaching its pinnacle between 1966 and 1972,
(Lippard 1973) but can be more broadly conceived as any work seeking to overcome the view that art
ought to produce something with aesthetic value. Conceptual art is art of the mind, not the senses; art
in which the idea is the most important aspect of the work.
2. The comparison of various deęnitions of ‘aesthetic’ is a core aspect of this paper, so I will avoid
misleading the reader by promoting one deęnition at the outset.
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that “CA is not art because art is necessarily aesthetic” with the argument that “art is
not necessarily aesthetic and therefore CA is art” would be to fall prey to a textbook
case of denying the antecedent. Nevertheless, addressing the shortcomings of what
have come to be known as ‘aesthetic deęnitions of art’ is a natural starting point for
this discussion. Monroe Beardsley is the greatest proponent of such deęnitions and the
philosophermost prominently associatedwith the ęrst solution—denying proposition
(i). To progress with a deęnition of art that incorporates CA as a subtype, suĜcient
reason must be provided to move beyond Beardsley’s deęnition.
2.1 Conceptual art as a kind of art
Deęnitions of art have been classięed by Stephen Davies (2001) into functional and in-
stitutional/historical deęnitions. Functional deęnitions hold that something is an art-
work if and only if it succeeds in achieving the purpose for which we have art. Beard-
sley’s deęnition has emerged as the most prominent of these. He proposed that art is
deęned by its aesthetic character such that x is an artwork if and only if x gives rise to
an aesthetic experience (Beardsley 1970).
A work of art is either an arrangement of conditions intended to be capable
of aěording an experience with marked aesthetic character or (one) [ … ]
typically intended to have this capacity. (Beardsley 1958)3
Beardsley’s conception holds that an aesthetic experience is, broadly speaking, an
experience of the way things appear to us, where the ‘thing’ that gives rise to the aes-
thetic experience is a perceptual object.4 Of course, many objects whose qualities are
open to direct sensory awareness do not give rise to aesthetic experiences. Precisely
what determines whether an object is aesthetic will be the subject of discussion later in
this paper. For now, it will be suĜcient to highlight that Beardsley’s deęnition of art,
and the assumption that CA does not give rise to aesthetic experience, together entail
the denial that works of conceptual art—such as Marcel Duchamp’s readymades—
count as art.
In contrast to Beardsley’s deęnition, Arthur Danto’s ‘institutional’ deęnition states
that one of the necessary conditions of an artwork is that it requires an art historical
context (Danto 1981). Similarly, Binkley (1977) states that “An artwork’s being an art-
work is determined not by its properties but by its location in the artworld”. Danto’s
3. This deęnition should not be misconstrued as a contradiction to another of his seminal works co-
authored byWilliam K. WimsaĴ, “The Intentional Fallacy” (1946), where it is argued that the intentions
of the artist aren’t relevant to the interpretation of awork of art. Our present concern iswith the deęnition,
not the interpretation, of art.
4. A perceptual object (as contrasted with a physical object like something that is six by six feet in
size) here refers to an object some of whose qualities are open to direct sensory awareness (Beardsley
1970), like a ‘frightening’ object. A physical object is not necessarily perceptual.
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reasoning is that there exist some artworks with perceptually indistinguishable coun-
terparts that are either artistically distinct or are “mere real things”. In fact, the claim
that “to see something as art requires something the eye cannot descry” has come to
be known as one of the hallmarks of Danto’s aesthetics (Lamarque 2007). So, Danto ar-
gues, it is only within the context of the artworld, and a viewer having prior knowledge
that the object is an artwork, that Duchamp’s Fountain could take on the properties of,
‘impudence’ and ‘wit’. These are obviously properties that conventional urinals lack.
David Davies deęnes artworks by the process that results in their creation. He
argues that the ‘thing’ to which we might aĴribute value or appreciation is the act
by which it came into being—the material result is merely a vehicle that allows us to
perceive the process (2003). Davies says that this vehicle may be a physical object (e.g.
Picasso’s Guernica) or an action of a particular kind (e.g. Duchamp’s act of placing
Fountain in a gallery space). The vehicle is whatever we have a perceptual engagement
with and the idea is what we have aesthetic/cognitive appreciation for.
The question facing us now is whether we are warranted in moving past Beards-
ley’s deęnition and adopting one along the lines of Danto’s or Davies’. Stephen Davies
(2001) advises that a deęnition of art should identify a set of properties such that each
and every artwork has all the properties that make up that set and that it is only art-
works that have that exact set of properties. Contrast this with Beardsley’s deęnition,
which outlines what art should be or really is, rather than aĴempting to capture all the
works considered as art currently in existence. In light of this, Beardsley’s relatively
narrow deęnition seems arbitrary. If Beardsley had been writing in the 16th century
with only Titian and Bruegel to reference—and had developed a conception of art and
aesthetic value around the output of these and any preceding artists—one might won-
der whether he would then have rejected any later art that required a redeęnition of
art itself. It seems fairly likely that Picasso and Miró would have been excluded from
the canon of art if that were the case. Beardsley said that “it does not seem that in
submiĴing that object (Fountain) to the art show […] Duchamp establish[ed] a new
meaning of ‘artwork,’ nor did he really inaugurate a tradition that led to the accept-
ance of plumbing ęgures as artworks today” (Beardsley 1958). Yet, with the beneęt of
hindsight, we can see that this is precisely what Duchamp did do. It seems entirely im-
plausible now, 37 years after Beardsley, to deny the status of art to the works of Marcel
Duchamp, Marina Abramović and Joseph Kosuth given that they aĴract millions of
art lovers each year to art institutions like MoMA and the Tate Modern. This aĴitude
follows Timothy Binkley’s basic reasoning:
How do I know they are works of art? […] they are listed in catalogues. So
I assume they are works of art. If you deny (this), it is up to you to explain
why the listings in a Renoir catalogue are artworks, but the listings in a
Duchamp catalogue are not. (Binkley 1977)
Granted, this argument is not suĜcient to prove that CA really is art, but it does
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push the burden of proof onto Beardsley to defend the aesthetic theory of art. It is
not for the aesthetic theorist to stipulate what should count as art in the face of such
countervailing evidence (Carroll 1999). This is a signięcant foothold. If we accept that
the burden has fallen onto Beardsley to prove that CA is not art, and we appreciate
that this is something he doesn’t aĴempt beyond arguing that the aesthetic deęnition
works for art up until 1982, I would posit that we now have the grounds to progress
with a tentative use of the laĴer two deęnitions from Danto and Davies. I believe I
have now presented enough evidence to show that the ęrst solution to the problem of
conceptual art is suĜciently weak that we might disregard it. CA is a kind of art.
2.2 Existing solutions to the problem of conceptual art
I now move on to the question of whether or not CA is necessarily aesthetic. Binkley
and Danto both propose theories that use examples of conceptual art to argue that it is
not a necessary or suĜcient condition of an artwork to be aesthetic (or fall within the
subject maĴer of aesthetics). Binkley (1977) is most notable for claiming that artworks
have become synonymous with aesthetic objects as a result of the conĚation of the
ęelds of aesthetics and the philosophy of art. He outlines a brief history of aesthetics,
referring to the point at which art began to fall into the subject maĴer of aesthetics.
Binkley claims that this occurred to such an extent that aesthetics mistakenly became
“just another name for the philosophy of art” and the ęrst principle of the philosophy of
art that “all art possesses aesthetic qualities”. This is indeed reminiscent of Beardsley’s
deęnition. Binkley stresses that they are nothing more than related studies. He cites a
number of conceptual artworks that do not appear to be necessarily aesthetic.
It would be a mistake to search for aesthetically interesting smudges on
Rauschenberg’s work “erased DeKooning drawing”. (Binkley 1977)
Binkley defends ‘non-aesthetic’ works like Rauschenberg’s by relating the devel-
opment of Modernism in art to movements of self-criticism within philosophy. Like
philosophy, Binkley supposes, art developed to the point where “a critical act about
the discipline could be part of the discipline itself”. The underlying problem iden-
tięed here by Binkley is that aesthetics has disregarded the fact that how an object
is perceived is actually dependent on what viewers bring to it. This, in turn is de-
pendent on cultural contexts. Aesthetics—which is an inherently perceptual inquiry—
views an artistic medium as a kind of substance rather than as a system of conventions.
While the ęelds of aesthetics and the philosophy of art have extensive commonground,
neither one is a sub-specialty of the other. Danto (1981) also alludes to the distinction
between the two ęelds, holding that art appreciation is primarily a cognitive maĴer
while aesthetic appreciation is a form of sense perception. Danto extends his analysis
back to 16th century art, claiming that the appreciation of Bruegel’s ‘Landscape with
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the fall of Icarus’ depends almost entirely on what information the viewer possesses.
Crucially, he argues that such information is not perceptually available.
Elizabeth Schellekens and James Shelly, on the other hand, maintain that art is ne-
cessarily aesthetic. Schellekens’ is an advocate of the ‘second solution’ I outlined in
section 2, denying (ii) that CA is not aesthetic. She proposes that CA need not be ‘an-
tiaesthetic’, and that “conceptual art may have aesthetic value that is crucial to the
appreciation of its cognitive value” (Schellekens 2007). She assumes that to appreciate
a work of conceptual art, it is necessary to have a ęrst hand experience of its central
idea. This involves the ‘experiential qualities’ of such ideas—and aesthetic qualities, it
is claimed, are amongst these. The key argumentative feature of her paper is themodel-
ling of the relationship between aesthetic and cognitive value in art. It is proposed that
the cognitive value we hold in conceptual artworks is not limited to the kind of know-
ledge that can be translated into orderly propositions. Schellekens suggests that if this
were the case, then there would be no diěerence between experiencing certain works
of art and, for instance, experiencing a billboard advertising the same propositional
content. Her central claim is that conceptual artworks can ‘instantiate’ propositional
statements, therefore giving rise to increased understanding of the idea.
James Shelly (2003) observed that the main arguments against art being necessar-
ily aesthetic presuppose that aesthetic properties must be susceptible to perception in
terms of the ęve senses. Shelley argues that this view of aesthetic properties is too lim-
ited. He denies that aesthetic properties necessarily depend on properties perceived
by means of the ęve senses. This move allows him to hold that there may be artworks
that do not need to be perceived by the ęve senses in order to be appreciated, while also
holding that artworks do necessarily have aesthetic properties relevant to their appre-
ciation. He argues that if thiswasn’t the case wewould not be able to call literaryworks
aesthetic.
3 Conceptual art is not necessarily aesthetic
The problem of conceptual art seems to boil down to a disagreement over what exactly
it means to say that aesthetic properties must be susceptible to perception. Shelley
thinks that since the qualities that we aĴribute to works of conceptual art (impudence,
wit etc.) correspond to the role traditionally played by standard aesthetic properties,
we do not have the grounds to deny them aesthetic status. In this section I aĴempt to
undermine Shelley and Schellekens’ position, voice support for the intuition behind
Danto and Binkley’s position and ultimately argue that CA is not necessarily aesthetic.
The weakness of Shelley’s (2003) paper lies in his supposition that it is possible to
have aesthetic experiences of non-perceptual artworks. Proposing that some aesthetic
properties may not be perceptual does not lead to the conclusion that art is ‘essentially
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aesthetic’. There are, for example, many artworks that may be formless andmay fail to
obtain the aesthetic qualities that the artist intended them to have. This art, according
to Carroll (2004) is what we call ‘bad art’—but bad art is still art.
It seems to me that the word aesthetic has been used far beyond its rightful domain
by both Shelley and Schellekens. I maintain that their deęnitions of aesthetic experi-
ence are too broad in two distinct ways. The ęrst is in the calling of things other than
perceptual things ‘aesthetic’ and the second is in the assumption that all perceptual
things can be aesthetic. Schellekens argues that “aesthetic value can be allowed for [ …
] as long as the aesthetic qualities in question are ascribed to the idea at the heart of the
artwork” (2007). Her aim, like Shelly’s, is to escape the problem of ‘non-perceptual’
art. Schellekens compares the appreciation of the idea of a work of conceptual art to
the appreciation of the ‘harmony’ of an intellectual process, the ‘elegance’ of a math-
ematical demonstration, the ‘beauty’ of a chess move and the ‘ungainliness’ of a failed
experiment. Based on this analogy, she concludes that there should be no diĜculty in
the suggestion that ideas and intellectual processes can allow for aesthetic qualities.
My primary contention with Schellekens’ thesis is this: to appreciate an idea—
which is nothing more than a cognitive experience—as ‘beautiful’, ‘graceful’ or ‘mov-
ing’ in theway she describes, is to do nothingmore than speakmetaphorically about that
idea. Simply being able to describe somethingwith an aesthetic termdoes notmean that
thing must be aesthetic. Consider the following:
If the idea is well represented through its vehicular medium, it is the art-
work conceived as idea—not the medium—that can be said to have certain
aesthetic qualities. (Schellekens 2007).
By clustering together the common intuitions that art is generally aesthetic and that
conceptual artworks are, fundamentally, ideas, Schellekens has suggested that ideas
can have aesthetic qualities. I argue that she has actually just conĚated the notions of
something’s being able to be described with certain aesthetic qualities and something’s
being able to possess aesthetic qualities. Schellekens does not address the possibility
that such a connection has appeared simply as a result of using linguistic ęgures of
speech in which words or phrases are applied to other objects or actions to which they
are not literally applicable.
It is quite reasonable—and in fact extremely common—to use aesthetic terms in a
metaphorical sense. My contention is not that use of such language is unwarranted but
rather that Schellekens’ use of this literary technique as empirical evidence of some un-
derlying connection between ideas and aesthetic value has been insuĜciently justięed
in her paper. When Schellekens talks of the ‘harmony’ of an intellectual process, we
might imagine it being a well-organised process in which each aspect of it is in con-
cord; with the ‘beautiful’ chess move, we might imagine that it was probably a move
that won the game, and because of the rare combination of moves employed, the op-
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ponent, statistically speaking, would have had some diĜculty in seeing it coming. To
reiterate, the ability we have to describe an idea or intellectual process with an adject-
ive that is typically (and in basic or conventional language, literally) used to aĴribute
aesthetic value to things does not mean that such objects are open to the possibility of
actually accruing aesthetic value themselves. My ability to describe the mood of a per-
son as ‘blue’ provides no support for the claim that moods or emotions (which have
signięcantly more in common with ideas than with artworks) might be considered
aesthetic objects. In nonmetaphorical language, the relation between an object’s being
something on the one hand and being able to be described as something on the other
hand is not a symmetrical one. Only the former can entail the laĴer.
I do not mean to suggest, in making this argument, than any or all descriptions of
works of conceptual art using aesthetic terms aremetaphorical. I am simply aĴempting
to show that Schellekens’ argument does not hold because the connection between
chess moves and the ideas behind them doesn’t exist between art and its ideas. The
former is not a truly aesthetic relationship, and therefore cannot be used to evidence
the claim that ideas can have aesthetic value. In the absence of any further support for
this theory, I believe I can conclude that CA is not necessarily aesthetic. Given that CA
is art (from section 2.1) this allows me to deduce that art is not necessarily aesthetic.
AdmiĴedly, this discussionmerits the formulation of a newdeęnition of aesthetic—
a description of what makes something truly aesthetic in the way that the chess move
is not; in a way that, I hope, the reader nonetheless intuitively understands. A new
deęnition of art is not required to present the conclusions of this paper.
4 Non-aesthetic art and the experiential condition
The purpose of this section is twofold. I will initially outline my own defence of the
possibility of non-aesthetic art before presenting a number of brief responses to the
problems that accepting such a possibility might appear to entail. Where my opin-
ion diverges with Danto’s (and aligns with Schellekens’), is in their discussions of the
necessarily perceptual nature of art. I argue, not only that art is necessarily percep-
tual5—in that it must be experienced in person—but that this ought to be considered
as one of the key identifying features of it.
There is an analogy to be made between the use of vocabulary in a novel and the
use of material in a conceptual artwork; the pace at which the novelist lets the plot un-
wind and the subtletywithwhich conceptual artists place some propositionalmeaning
amongst the mediums of their work. The choice of vocabulary is a necessary compon-
5. Note that this does not contradict the point made by Shelley that literary works needn’t be per-
ceived. When Shelley talked of ‘the work’, he was talking of the art—we can’t perceive the ‘art’ of a
novel because it exists in the imaginative, cognitive ‘dimension’. When I talk of necessarily perceptual
(or experiential) here, I simply mean that one needs to have a direct experience with the object.
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ent of the overall vehicle which is to eventually deliver aesthetic content to the reader
in the sameway that themedium (whether it be sound or a performance) is a necessary
component of the overall vehicle which is eventually to deliver cognitive content to the
viewer. To say that a viewer can gain all there is to gain from hearing a description of a
conceptual artwork (as Peter Lamarque (2007) does) would be to say that a reader can
gain all there is to gain from a novel by hearing a summary of it. This obviously isn’t
the case. As Schellekens (2007) observes, conceptual artists choose to represent their
points in such a way as to not onlymake a statement but also to instantiate it—they can
“turn propositional statements into something more experiential”. The act of exper-
iencing a conceptual artwork in person carries with it some of the semantic content
which is necessary to appreciate it cognitively. At this stage it will be useful to look at
a scorecard of where I now stand on the range of issues covered so far in this paper.
Conditions/mechanisms ‘Traditional’ art Literary art Conceptual art
Necessarily aesthetic 3 3
Necessarily experiential6 3 3 3
Necessarily cognitive 3 3 3
Direct perceptual mechanism 3
Indirect vehicular mechanism 3 3
Allowme to Ěesh out the claims made in this table. The key takeaway is that all art
(traditional, literary and conceptual) is necessarily experiential and necessarily cognit-
ive but is not necessarily aesthetic. Consider John Cage’s composition 4′33″ for which
the score instructs the performers not to play their instruments during the entire dur-
ation of the piece. The claim that art is not necessarily experiential entails that being
present for a performance of a work like 4′33″ has no bearing on someone’s ability to
understand, appreciate or interpret the work—it might as well have been summarised
by someone else who has seen it. This feels intuitively wrong. People travel for thou-
sands of miles to see the Mona Lisa and the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel in person
just as they would have with Marina Abramović’s 2010 performance work “The Artist
is Present”. People do not, however, travel to watch mathematicians write out their
proofs.
Of course, this analogy does not in itself show that the deęning feature of art is
that it is necessarily experiential. One obvious rebuĴal would be to highlight the fact
that people do travel long distances to see non-artistic events like chess matches and
political speeches. It might be argued that the ‘experience’ of watching a match or a
speech cannot be fully conveyed by someone’s testimony. If political speeches are ne-
cessarily experiential, then using this condition as away to identify artworks is entirely
undermined. AdmiĴedly, the emotions that those present in the House of Commons
must have felt while witnessing Winston Churchill’s 1940 speech “We shall ęght on
the beaches” is something that they will never be able to fully convey by retelling the
6. This is has been called the ‘experiential requirement’ by Schellekens.
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story of what happened. However, anyone who raises such a counterargument is neg-
lecting one signięcant diěerence which breaks down the analogy between these two
examples. Anything that Churchill’s audience gained from experiencing his speech
in person, over and above the propositional content expressed, did not arise from his
speech. If we stripped his speech of all context—the atmosphere and energy in the
room; the physical grandeur of the House of Commons etc—what would remain is its
pure propositional content. This fundamental content is transferrable in its entirety by
testimony or recording. It is not necessary to experience it to gain a full understanding
of it.
Only art is necessarily experiential in the sense in which I am employing the word.
Just as there is one sense in which we might experience a Dostoyevsky novel as a soci-
ological account of St Petersburg in 1866, and another sense in which wemight experi-
ence it qua art; so too are there diěerent senses in which we experience other artworks.
That Churchill’s speech lends itself to being experienced in the former sense does not
imply that it must—or even can—be experienced in the laĴer sense; the sense of exper-
iencing something qua art. As Lamarque rightly notes, “one of the binding elements
[in experiencing all of the arts] can be described as an experience of art as art”.
Experience in this sense, Lamarque highlights, is “informed by knowledge about
the kinds of objects being experienced” (2007). The type of experiencing which I am
referring to is what I suggest ought to be considered a necessary condition for some-
thing being an artwork. It may strike the reader that I appear to have oěered a circular
deęnition of art by suggesting that artworks are those objects that must be experienced
in the unique in particular way that only artworks can be. This would of course fail as
a deęnition; but the account I have just oěered is by no means an aĴempt to provide a
non-aesthetic deęnition of art. My purpose is much simpler; to disentangle the notion
of art being necessarily aesthetic with the notion of of art being necessarily experiential
and to reject the former in favour of the laĴer.
The trap that the Churchill counterexample has fallen intomay bemore easily iden-
tięed if we consider a musical example of the same problem. A live performance of
Pink Floyd’s “ComfortablyNumb”provides the audiencewith exactly the same artistic
content as listening to a recording of it. The distinction I am drawing upon here is not
captured by thinking of ‘live performances’ in this sense. Rather, I am suggesting that
it is necessary just to listen to a performance of “Comfortably Numb” (whether it be a
recording or a live performance) in order to appreciate it. The work cannot be suitably
appreciated if only a summary or description is given. CA needs to be experienced in
the same way literature and music do because the thing that maĴers for the identity of
an experience is not what the experience is of in the sense of what has caused it (such
as facts about the performance that can easily be transferred by testimony) but what it
is thought to be of—thought at that very specięc time and place by that particular per-
son (Lamarque 2007). Ideas are necessary but not suĜcient for a conceptual artwork
to exist. 4’33” cannot be collapsed into a mere supposition or description. It needs to
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be experienced.
I will now brieĚy consider two problems that face advocates of the possibility of
non-aesthetic art and propose that by accepting the experiential thesis just outlined,
one can avoid all three of them. The problems are; (1) how might we distinguish
between art and non-art in light of artworks not being deęned by necessarily hav-
ing aesthetic value; and (2) how might we appreciate artworks given that there is no
aesthetic object to direct our appreciation towards.
Schellekens’ thesis about the aesthetic value of ideas arose, at least in part, from
a concern about what would secure a “signięcant distinction between art on the one
hand, and the ordinary proposition or statement expressing that same idea in a non-
artistic context on the other hand” (Schellekens 2007). I propose that the ‘experiential
condition’ does precisely that. As was illustrated in Figure 1, all three categories of
art are necessarily experiential and necessarily cognitive. There is no class of objects
other than artworks that possess this experiential condition in the specięc sense that
I outlined in detail in the previous section. No other class of objects comes to mind
that possesses this necessary condition in the sameway that works of art do. Referring
back to Stephen Davies’ requirements for a deęnition, this condition is suĜcient to
distinguish between art and non-art.
Regarding the appreciation of non-aesthetic artworks, I suggest that the experien-
tial condition’s ability to cater for the purely cognitive appreciation of conceptual art-
works as well as the jointly aesthetic and cognitive appreciation of traditional artworks
means that it can oěer a neater and simpler solution to the problem of conceptual art
than the other solutions outlined here. Appreciating a conceptual work of art that has
no aesthetic content is no more complicated than appreciating a Titian or a Bruegel—
both provide the opportunity for cognitive appreciation of ideas and concepts and the
16th century works also provide the opportunity for aesthetic appreciation.
5 Conclusion
I began this paper by articulating what I referred to as ‘the problem of conceptual art’,
presenting three independently plausible propositions that contradicted each other. I
then presented a range of existing solutions to this (or very similar) problems before
puĴing forward a brief argument as towhy conceptual art should count as a kind of art.
In section 3, I found that none of the existing formulations of the philosophy of concep-
tual art were suitably coherent orwithout signięcant openings to criticism. This ledme
to suggest that conceptual art is not necessarily aesthetic. Accepting these two claims
allowed me to propose that art in general is not necessarily aesthetic. Based on the
weaknesses identięed in the papers presented here, I proposed that art is necessarily
experiential, before brieĚy outlining how this new understanding of the philosophy
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of conceptual art is not undermined by two major problems that aĝict many other
solutions to the problem of conceptual art.
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